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1.  Introduction  
Affirmative  action  policy  regulates  the  allocation  of  limited  opportunities  in 
education,  employment,  business  contracting,  credit,  public  housing,  and  the  like,  to 
increase the representation of persons belonging to certain population subgroups (Fryer 
and Loury, 2005). 
The  main  strand  in  the  economic  literature  on  affirmative  action  focuses  on 
efficiency, examining the potential role of affirmative action in correcting market failures 
(eliminating  discrimination  or  internalizing  externalities).  The  seminal  paper  in  this 
literature  is  Coate  and  Loury  (1993),  which  examines  whether  affirmative  action 
eliminates employers' negative stereotypes about the capabilities of minority employees 
that result in under-investment in human capital by the latter.  
However,  affirmative  action  also  bears  controversial  equity  implications  as  it 
redistributes  across  racial/ethnic  population  groups.  Contrary  to  the  more  passive 
practice, non-discrimination, in which the normative principle is simply to refrain from 
treating  people  differently  on  the  basis  of  race  or  other  protected  characteristics, 
affirmative action actively offers particular groups, thought to need special treatment, 
preferential  access  to  important  social  resources.  The  public  associates  non-
discrimination with the universally praised norm of equal opportunity, while generally 
disparaging preferences as a demand for equal outcomes or special treatment (Schuck, 
2002).
1  As  a  result,  affirmative  action  has  never  had  much  public  support.  The  vast 
                                                 
1  The public disconcert is somewhat mitigated by calling for “greater outreach” to minority communities 
and talking about “preferential boosts,” “goals and timelines” instead of imposing quotas or using the term 
“preferences.”  However,  closer  examination  reveals  that  under  a  plausible  assumption  of  imperfect    3
majority of Americans, including more than a third of blacks, oppose racial preferences 
in hiring and promotion (Schuman et al., 1997). 
In this paper, we offer a fresh look at the redistributive question, by bringing to 
the  table  a  different  justification  for  the  use  of  affirmative  action  as  a  redistributive 
device. Instead of analyzing it merely as a tool designed to redistribute across population 
groups  (e.g.,  from  whites  to  blacks),  we  establish  a  case  for  supplementing  the 
redistributive tax-transfer system by affirmative action to enhance redistribution across 
skills (rather than across groups), relying on a correlation between earning ability and 
ethnicity/race. 
The  existence  of  such  a  correlation  is  supported  by  advocates  of  affirmative 
action, who seek to justify affirmative action as a forward-looking  and  remedial tool 
addressing a significant gap in skills between blacks and whites, the outcome of more 
than two hundred years of discrimination (Sunstein, 1994). According to these advocates, 
racial inequality today is mostly driven by the supply-side of the labor market rather than 
the demand side (prejudice), thus calling for something more than only the prevention of 
discrimination (Loury, 1998; Arrow, 1998). The gap in skills is a reflection of social and 
cultural  factors,  such  as  geographic  segregation  (see  Loury,  1977);  deleterious  social 
                                                                                                                                                  
information  regarding  employers’  desires  to  discriminate  and  the  fraction  of  qualified  minorities  who 
applied for each firm, there is no difference between greater outreach or goals, and a quota (Fryer, 2004). 
Hence, greater outreach is translated into redistribution of jobs and educational resources from members of 
the  majority  group  to  minorities.  For  example,  employers  who  wish  to  avoid  disparate  impact 
discrimination  claims  (that  is,  comply  with  antidiscrimination  laws),  make  sure  that  targeted  group 
members are adequately represented among their hires, leading in essence to an affirmative action quota 
effect.     4
norms and peer influences; and poor educational quality. Moreover, each individual is 
socially situated, and one's location within the network of social affiliations substantially 
affects one's access to various resources. It has been well established that an individual's 
inherited social situation plays a major role in determining ultimate economic success 
(Loury, 1998). 
It should be emphasized that we are not arguing that race-based discrimination 
has been fully eliminated. To the extent that it exists, affirmative action may be viewed as 
an additional tool in the arsenal of anti-discrimination laws. However, to the extent that it 
redistributes  beyond  what  is  necessary  to  correct  for  discrimination,  it  is  a  purely 
redistributive device. This latter function of affirmative action is the focus of this paper. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present our 
model. In section 3, we examine the case for affirmative action. Section 4 extends the 
model to allow for redistribution across groups. In section 5, we conclude.  
 
2.  An Analytical Framework 
Consider an economy with a population equally divided between 'tall' (j=T) and 
'short'  (j=S)  individuals.
2  We  normalize  the  population  of  each  type  to  unity.  Each 
individual  (tall  or  short)  may  be  either  high-skilled  (i=H)  or  low-skilled  (i=L).  We 
assume  that  production  technology  exhibits  constant  returns  to  scale  and  perfect 
substitution across the various skill levels. We denote the productivity (hence the hourly 
wage rate in an unregulated competitive labor market) of a typical high-skilled individual 
by  w, and that of a typical low-skilled individual by  w, where  0 > > w w . We further 
                                                 
2  'Height' is a general name for an exogenously given observable attribute.     5
denote  by  j i, α   the  number  of  individuals  of  skill  i  and  'height'  j  in  the  population. 
Following the standard Mirrlees (1971) framework, we assume that the skill (earning 
ability)  attribute  is  observed  by  both  workers  and  employers,  but  unobserved  by  the 
government. We further assume that  1 0 , , < < < T H S H α α , namely, that the tall population is 
on  average  more  skilled,  which  may  reflect  poor  early  background  for  the  short 
population group members, possibly attributed to past discrimination driven by prejudice, 
or  self-fulfilling  negative  stereotypes  (statistical  discrimination).
3  Denote  by  T K  
(respectively,  H K ), an indicator function that takes the value 1 if an individual is tall 
(respectively, high-skilled) and zero otherwise. Note that the coefficient of correlation 
between height and skill is given by 
S H T H S H T H
S H T H
H T K K r




α α α α
α α
− − ⋅ +
−
= , which is 
positive, by assumption. Note also that r is increasing in  T H, α  and decreasing in  S H, α . In 
particular,  at  the  limits,  when S H T H , , α α = ,  there  is  a  zero  correlation;  whereas  when 
0   and   1 , , = = S H T H α α , there is a perfect correlation between being high-skilled and being 
tall. The assumption regarding a positive correlation between height and skill implies that 
in an unregulated labor market, short individuals are over-represented (relative to their 
                                                 
3  The assumption may plausibly describe the situation of the black minority in the US. The choice of short 
individuals to be the disadvantaged group is clearly arbitrary, but may be symbolic, as in this paper, we 
focus on the government's challenge in addressing the issue of vertical equity.      6
share  in  the  general  population)  in  low  paying  jobs.
4    For  later  purposes,  denote  by 
  ,   and   L α α H the fraction of high-skilled (respectively, low-skilled) individuals in society. 
We assume that all individuals share the same utility. Following Diamond (1998), 
for simplicity, we adopt a quasi-linear specification: 
(1)  ) ( ) , ( l h c l c U U − = = ,  
where c denotes consumption, l denotes labor and h is increasing and strictly convex. As 
is common in the optimal tax literature, we denote by y the labor income of an individual, 
so that  w y l / = . Thus, we rewrite the utility function of an individual with a wage rate of 
w as: 
(2)  ) / , ( ) , , ( w y c U y c w V = . 
We assume that society cares about inequality across skill levels, as is customary 
in  the  public  finance  literature.
5  For  concreteness,  we  consider  an  egalitarian  social 
welfare function, which takes the following CES special form: 
(3)  ∑ ⋅ =
i
i i V W ρ α
ρ / , 
where  1 0 < ≠ ρ . 
In order to address the issue of inequality, the government may consider the use 
of several redistributive tools. We will examine two such redistributive tools: affirmative 
action and the income tax-transfer system. 
                                                 
4 There is a substantial Black-White test score gap, which grows throughout the school years. For a recent 
discussion,  see  Fryer  and  Levitt  (2004).  If  minimum  wage  were  imposed,  it  would  imply  a  higher 
unemployment incidence among the short population. 
5 In section 4 below, we extend the analysis by incorporating into the social welfare function a preference 
for re-distribution across height groups.    7
 
 
2.1  Affirmative Action   
Consider the following simplified form of affirmative action legislation. The law 
would impose, upon all employers, targets to achieve mixing of tall and short in the 
workforce that reflects their share in the general population. What we have in mind is the 
following: One can define a standard job by a fixed number of working hours (say, per 
week)  and  require  that  the  distribution  of  standard  jobs  would  reflect  the  height 
distribution in society. To simplify the notation, we normalize the number of hours per 
standard job to one. Affirmative action policy that focuses on average representation in 
each firm reflects the fact that the government cannot readily observe individuals' skill 
levels and thus is unable to regulate jobs according to skill levels (say, by requiring that 
for each job, given its associated skill level, the short population be represented according 
to its relative share in the general population).
6 Whereas the model we introduce, in the 
spirit  of  the  classic  Mirrlees  (1971)  framework,  focuses  on  the  intensive  margin;  it 
captures in a reduced form the essential fact that the short population is under-represented 
in the labor market.
7 
                                                 
6 This policy is similar to CAFÉ standards applied in the context of car emissions to regulate the level of 
pollution, where each car manufacturer is faced with average emission requirements as opposed to per-
model restrictions. See Parry & Portney, Paul & Harrington, Winston & Gruenspecht (2003).  
7 One could think of extending the model to allow for a secondary sector (possibly unemployment), where 
both population groups are faced with equal job opportunities. In such a case, the short population would be 
under-represented in the primary sector. Such an extension will complicate the analysis without changing 
the gist of our argument.     8
By  virtue of  the constant returns  to scale  assumption,  the number  of  firms  is 
indeterminate, and we focus our discussion on a representative firm. We characterize the 
equilibrium in a labor market regulated by affirmative action policy as described above.
8 
We assume that the labor market is perfectly competitive. We first analyze the firm’s 
behavior. Note that by virtue of affirmative action, there can potentially be four different 
wage rates, as individuals differ on two attributes: skill and height. In particular, this 
infers difference in wage rates within the same skill level across population  groups.
9 
While this is not what we see in reality, because wage discrimination is illegal, it captures 
in reduced form the inherent discriminating nature of affirmative action policy, which 
implies, at the bottom line, higher expected remuneration for targeted group members (in 
each  and  every  skill  level).
10  Preferring  short  individuals  over  equally  skilled  tall 
individuals  in  hiring  and  in  promotion  is  equivalent  to  offering  the  short  individuals 
higher expected remuneration. 
We denote by  j i w ,  the equilibrium wage rate paid to a typical individual with skill 
i and height j, where  L H i , =  and S T j , = . The representative firm, faced with the market 
                                                 
8 We confine our attention to equilibria with full employment. See, however, footnote 12 below, which 
addresses the possibility of equilibrium where the low-skilled tall individuals are driven out of the labor 
market by affirmative action policy. 
9  Note, however, that in a labor market with initial discrimination against the short, affirmative action 
would mitigate the wage difference across 'heights' for each skill level. In essence, affirmative action would 
then be a form of anti-discrimination policy. 
10 Put differently, affirmative action “will generally lead to an equilibrium in which the targeted applicants 
of a given skill level enjoy wider job options, more bargaining power and, consequently, greater 
remuneration than comparable non-targeted applicants” (Fryer and Loury, 2005).    9
wage rates, determines labor demand for each type of worker j i x , ( , measured in working 
hours/jobs) by maximizing: 
(4)  ∑∑ − ⋅ ≡
i j
j i i j i w z x ) ( , , π ,  
subject to the affirmative action constraint: 




T i x x , , ; 
where  w zH =  and  w zL =  denote, respectively, the productivity of a high-skilled (low-
skilled)  individual.  The  affirmative  action  constraint  simply  states  that  the  aggregate 
number  of  standard  jobs  filled  by  the  two  height  groups  is  the  same  (recall  that  we 
assume that the two height groups are of equal size). The maximization yields the firm's 
labor demand for each type of worker,  ) , , ( , , , , , T L T H S L S H j i w w w w x ;  L H i , =  and  S T j , = . 
Note that the demand for each type of worker depends on all four wage rates and on the 
two productivity levels. We henceforth drop the arguments of the functions  ) ( , ⋅ j i x  in 
order to abbreviate the notation. 
Individuals determine their labor supply by maximizing the utility in (2) given the 
market wage rates. We denote by  ) (w l  the labor supply of an individual facing a wage 
rate of w. Note that, by virtue of our assumptions on the utility function, the labor supply 
is upward sloping. Market clearance requires that demand equal supply for each type of 
worker, that is: 
(6) 
). ( ) 1 (







S L S H S L
T L T H T L
S H S H S H













    10
We now turn to characterizing the equilibrium profile of wage rates. First, note 
that  by  virtue  of  the  affirmative  action  constraint  in  (5),  a  necessary  condition  for 
equilibrium to exist would be the following: 
(7)  S L S H w w w w , , − = − . 
To see this, note that the expression on the left side of equation (7) represents the net gain 
(for the firm) per hour (or job) worked by a high-skilled short individual. Similarly, the 
expression on the right side of equation (7) represents the net gain per hour worked by a 
low-skilled short individual. By way of contradiction, suppose that equilibrium exists 
where the equality in equation (7) is violated. With no loss of generality, let the net gain 
from an hour worked by a high-skilled short worker be greater than the net gain derived 
from an hour worked by a low-skilled short worker. In such a case, the firm can replace 
one working hour of a low-skilled short worker with that of a high-skilled short worker, 
increasing its profit without violating the affirmative action constraint.
11 Thus, we obtain 
a  contradiction to  the  presumed  profit  maximization. An  analogous  argument  for tall 
individuals implies that in equilibrium: 
(8)  T L T H w w w w , , − = − .
12 
                                                 
11  Recall that such a shift is feasible, as we focus on equilibria in which all types of workers are employed. 
12  While we choose to focus on the case of full employment equilibrium, equilibria where some individuals 
are driven out of the labor market may also exist. For example, there may exist an equilibrium where the 
low-skilled tall are offered a zero wage rate and therefore choose to stay out of the labor market. In such a 
case, the equality in (8) may turn into a strict inequality:  w w w T H > − , . Note that, as the firm does not hire 
the labor services of low-skilled tall individuals in such a case, it cannot raise its profits by replacing low-
skilled tall workers with high-skilled tall ones.    11
Finally, a necessary condition for equilibrium to exist is that the following equality holds: 
(9)  0 2 / ) ( , , = + − T H S H w w w . 
Condition (9) requires that an increase (or decrease) in the number of hours worked by 
both a high-skilled tall and a high-skilled short worker (so that the affirmative action 
constraint is maintained) cannot affect the firm’s profit. Otherwise, if the sign of (9) is 
positive (negative), the firm can increase its profits by increasing (decreasing) the number 
of working hours of both the high-skilled tall and short individuals. A similar condition 
holds for low-skilled individuals: 
(10)  0 2 / ) ( , , = + − T L S L w w w . 
(Note, however, that one of the four conditions, (7)-(10), is redundant). 
Substituting for the labor demands from the equations in (6) into the affirmative 
action  constraint  in  (5),  the  equilibrium  is  given  by  the  profile  of  wage  rates 
( S T j L H i w j i , ; , ; , = = ) that solve equations (5), (7), (8) and (9). Employing equations (9) 
and (10), we set  δ ε ε + = − = + = w w w w w w S L T H S H , , , , ,  and  δ − = w w T L, . Note that it 
follows from equation (7) that  δ ε = . It is also worth noting that the representative firm 
makes zero profits.
13  
  We next show that a unique equilibrium exists and that  ε  is strictly positive.  
Substituting the four labor demands into the affirmative action condition in (5) yields: 
                                                 
13  To see this, note that substituting the four wage rates into the profit function in (4), re-arranging terms, 
yields:  ) ( ) ( , , , , T L S L S H T H x x x x − ⋅ − − ⋅ = δ ε π . Employing the affirmative action constraint in (5), one can re-
write  the  profit  function  as follows:  T L S L S H T H x x x x x x , , , ,    where ), ( − = − ≡ − ⋅ = δ ε π .  The  result  follows  as 
δ ε = .    12
(11)    
), ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( , , , , ε ε α ε α ε α ε α ε S S H S H T H T H T L w l w l w l w l L ≡ + ⋅ − + + ⋅ = − ⋅ − + − ⋅ ≡  
where  ) (ε j L  denotes  the  aggregate  labor supply  of  individuals  of  height  j=T,S.  It  is 
straightforward to verify that in the absence of wage differences among individuals with 
the same skill (that is,  0 = ε ), the aggregate labor supply of the tall individuals would 
exceed that of the short individuals:  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( S T L L > . Moreover, setting  w = ε , it follows 
that:  )] ( [ lim 0 )] ( [ lim w L w L S w w T w w → → < = . Thus, when the productivity difference across 
skill levels is sufficiently small (namely,  w is sufficiently large),  ) ( ) ( w L w L S T < , hence, 
by  continuity  considerations,  a  solution  for  ε   (hence  equilibrium)  exists,  where 
w < <ε 0 . Moreover, ε  is unique because the labor supply function is strictly increasing. 
It is straightforward to verify that equation (8) is satisfied, thus all equilibrium conditions 
[(5),  (7),  (8),  (9)  and  the  zero  profit  condition]  are  satisfied.  This  concludes  the 
characterization of the equilibrium in the labor market with affirmative action.  
As expected, in order to induce higher participation of short individuals in the 
labor market, employers offer them a higher wage rate relative to tall individuals with the 
same  skill.  The  wage  difference  (for  each  skill  level)  is  given  by  ε 2 >0.  By  fully 
differentiating equation (11) with respect to  T H, α , one can verify that the wage difference 
is increasing with respect to the proportion of high-skilled tall individuals. Similarly, the 
wage difference is decreasing with respect to  S H, α , the proportion of high-skilled short 
individuals. Finally, it can be verified, by fully differentiating equation (11), taking the 
limit at  w w → , and noting that in this limiting case  0 → ε , that the wage difference is    13
decreasing  with  respect  to  w  when  the  productivity  difference  across  skill  levels  is 
sufficiently small.  
  We next consider a redistributive income tax-transfer system. 
 
2.2 An Income Tax 
Unlike  the  standard  optimal  income  tax  framework,  where  the  source  of 
inequality  derives  from  unobserved  variation  in  innate  earning  abilities,  the  height 
characteristic is both observable and immutable. One could, in principle, implement a 
height-sensitive system. In such a case, each short individual would be eligible for a 
transfer from the state, for example, through refundable credit.
14 This transfer would be 
financed by a lump-sum tax. Such a policy would entail no deadweight loss. This policy 
would  suffice  to  eliminate  any  inequality  between  height  groups  or  even  render 
preferential treatment to one group over the other. In light of the positive correlation 
between skill level and height, the latter serves as an extremely efficient 'tagging' device 
of the low-skilled (as in Akerlof 1978). Notably, when  0    and    1 , , = = S H T H α α , that is, 
when there is a perfect correlation between height and skill, such a policy would attain 
full equality (full redistribution across skill levels), with no distortions being entailed (the 
"first-best"). 
Similarly, affirmative action that redistributes from tall to short individuals may 
also  be  viewed  as  a  redistributive  tool  across  skill-levels  using  height  as  a  'tagging' 
device.  However,  unlike  the  height-sensitive  tax-transfer  system,  it  entails  significant 
labor-leisure distortions. For example, in the perfect correlation case, affirmative action 
                                                 
14 Alternately, the tax subsidy could be given to the employers of short individuals.    14
would also attain full equality,
15 but it would do so at the cost of labor supply distortions, 
increasing the labor supply of short individuals and decreasing the labor supply of tall 
individuals.  Hence  a  height-sensitive  income  tax  system  would  dominate  affirmative 
action policy, rendering the latter redundant for re-distributive purposes.
16 
Contrary to affirmative action that, although unpopular, has survived politically 
for four decades, a height-sensitive income tax system would be infeasible politically. 
Such a tax system would be viewed as allowing the tall to purchase a right to discriminate 
against the short [see, e.g., Darity and Frank (2003), Bell (1992), Donohue (1998), Kull 
(1994), cf. Cooter (1994)]. 
Moreover, a race-based tax system would be held unconstitutional by the courts. 
Affirmative action, on the other hand, was approved by the courts on many different 
occasions. Its economic equivalence to taxation has eluded the courts’ attention, probably 
by  following  the  same  logic  as  in  Rubenfeld  (1997),  according  to  which  there  is  a 
difference between taking “from whites (or anyone else) something they already have, as 
opposed to denying them an opportunity for which they are merely applying. … Thus, 
standard affirmative action plans would be constitutional, but a special tax levied only on 
whites  or  members  of  any  other  race  would  not.”  Hence,  affirmative  action  is  held 
constitutional, albeit on shaky grounds. A race-sensitive income tax system would not be.  
                                                 
15  In  such  a  case,  by  virtue  of  equation  (11),  the  uniform  wage  rate  is  given  by  the  average 
productivity 2 / ) ( w w + . 
16  As discussed in the introduction, affirmative action may be warranted on efficiency grounds. These, 
however, are beyond the scope of this paper.    15
In what follows, we focus on a second-best 'height-blind' income tax system. As is 
common in the income tax literature, we describe the tax system as a set of gross labor 
income-net labor income (consumption) bundles (y, c), where c denotes net labor income. 
A tax system has to satisfy self-selection constraints, which state that each type of worker 
has no incentive to mimic the other type. Denote the (y, c)-bundle of the high-skilled 
individuals and that of the low-skilled individuals by  ) , ( c y  and ) , ( c y , respectively. A 
high-skilled individual must be at least as well off with her bundle as with the bundle of 
the  low-skilled  individual,  and  vice-versa.  The  self-selection  constraints  are  therefore 
given as follows: 
(12)  ) , , ( ) , , ( y c w V y c w V ≥ , 
(13)  ) , , ( ) , , ( y c w V y c w V ≥ . 
The government seeks to maximize the social welfare function given in (3), subject to 
self-selection constraints (12) and (13) and a revenue constraint: 
(14)  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , , ≥ − ⋅ + + − ⋅ + c y c y S L T L S H T H α α α α . 
This specification assumes, with no loss in generality, that the government has no 
revenue needs (a purely re-distributive tax-transfer system).  
 
3.  A Case for Affirmative Action 
We now investigate whether supplementing a second-best height-blind income 
tax system by affirmative action would enhance social welfare. When affirmative action 
is in place, there are four different wage rates in the labor market equilibrium. As shown 
in  section  2.1,  for  each  skill  level,  the  wage-differential  across  'heights'  is  given  by    16
0 2 > ε , favoring short individuals. A height-blind income tax system is given by four 
different  (y,  c)  bundles.  The  government  would  seek  to  maximize  the  social  welfare 
function by choosing the four bundles and by setting the wage differential, satisfying the 
12 self-selection (no-mimicking) constraints
17 and an affirmative action constraint, which 
requires that the aggregate number of standard jobs filled by the two height groups is the 
same. In appendix A, we provide a formulation of the constrained optimization problem 
faced by the government. 
The following proposition states a sufficient condition for affirmative action to be 
a desirable supplement to the height-blind income tax system. 
Proposition: When the degree of aversion to inequality across skill levels is high enough 
(that is,  ρ  is sufficiently small
18), supplementing the height-blind income tax system 
with affirmative action would enhance social welfare when: (i) the correlation between 
height and skill level is sufficiently high; and (ii) the difference in productivity across 
skill levels is sufficiently small.  
Proof: See appendix B. QED  
The main lesson from the above proposition is that affirmative action may be 
socially desirable as a supplementary redistributive tool to the tax-transfer system. The 
rationale for the result is the following. Affirmative action would increase the wage rate, 
hence  the  well-being,  of  short  individuals  at  each  skill-level,  and,  correspondingly, 
                                                 
17 Recall that there are four types, where each can pretend to be any of the other three types. 
18  Parameter  ρ  should be bounded away from minus infinity (that is, a Rawlsian government), as in such 
a case, affirmative action turns out to be harmful and hence undesirable. For further details on this caveat, 
see appendix B.    17
decrease the wage rate, hence, the well-being, of tall individuals. Due to the positive 
correlation between height and skill, affirmative action results in targeting of transfers to 
the  low-skilled  ('tagging').  When  the  correlation  is  high  enough,  benefits  from 
redistribution are significant. In particular, in the case of perfect correlation between skill 
and  height,  affirmative  action  would  achieve  full  equality  (equal  wage  rate  for  all 
individuals in the economy). This goal could never be attained by the (height-blind) tax-
and-transfer system due to incentive compatibility constraints [see, e.g., Sadka (1976) 
and Stiglitz (1982)]. 
However,  affirmative  action  distorts  labor-leisure  choices  by  inducing  wage 
differentials across heights for each skill-level [the wage rate equals productivity for each 
skill-level only on average; see equations (9) and (10)], in order to increase the wage 
rates  of  short  individuals  and  thereby  their  participation  in  the  labor  market.  As  the 
productivity difference across skill levels declines the distortion caused by affirmative 
action policy decreases (as is reflected in reduced wage differentials). 
When the government exhibits a sufficiently high degree of inequality-aversion, 
supplementing  the  tax-and-transfer  system  with  affirmative  action  policy  would  be 
socially desirable under the conditions stated by the proposition, because the benefits of 
enhanced redistribution outweigh the costs of distorted labor-leisure choices.   
 
4.  Redistribution across Groups 
The case for affirmative action as a re-distributive tool becomes even stronger, 
when society cares not only about inequality across skills (within height groups) but also 
about  inequality  across  height  groups  (plausibly  justified,  when  the  inequality  across 
groups  is  driven  by  past  discrimination).  The  Equal  Protection  Clause  in  the  US    18
Constitution  can  be  interpreted  as  calling  for  redistribution  towards  especially 
disadvantaged groups (apart from individuals), such as blacks, that have suffered from 
perpetual  subordination  and  circumscribed  political  power  [see  Fiss  (1976)  for  the 
seminal  work on this issue]. One simple way to capture the two forms of inequality 
aversion is by letting the social welfare function assume the following specification: 
(15)  , / 1
1 ∑ =
j
j W W ρ
ρ    
where  ∑ ⋅ =
i
j i j i j V W 2 , , /
2 ρ α
ρ   denotes  the  aggregate  welfare  measure  for  population 
group  j,  and  1 , 0 2 1 < ≠ ρ ρ .  Parameter  1 ρ   measures  the  aversion  to  inequality  across 
heights; whereas parameter  2 ρ  measures the aversion to inequality across skills.  
Note that the transfer of one dollar from a high-skilled individual to a low-skilled 
individual in the same height group increases social welfare. Similarly, the transfer of one 
dollar from a tall individual to a short one of similar skill also increases social welfare. 
Further note that our specification of the social welfare function implies that a given level 
of wage inequality elicits more aversion by society when this inequality stems from a 
difference in height than a difference in skill. To see this, consider an economy where the 
population is equally divided between short and tall individuals. Suppose that one-half of 
the  population  is  low-skilled,  whereas  the  other  half  is  high-skilled.  Consider  the 
following two cases. In the first, all the short individuals are low-skilled and all the tall 
individuals are high-skilled. In the second case, one-half of the short individuals and one-
half of the tall individuals are low-skilled. According to the welfare specification we use, 
the second case is superior to the first one, although both cases exhibit the same overall    19
distribution of income (that is, one-half of the population is low-skilled and one-half is 
high-skilled). 
Although  the  case  for  affirmative  action  seems  to  be  strongest  when  society 
assigns a high weight to redistribution across groups, it is nevertheless possible that the 
(height-blind) tax-transfer system alone can serve this purpose more efficiently. In fact, 
as we demonstrate below, affirmative action could be harmful even if we assume that 
society  cares  only  about redistribution  across  groups  and that  the  degree  of  aversion 
towards inequality across groups is extreme. 
To see this, consider the following example. We assume that preferences take a 
quadratic  functional  form,  2 / ) , (
2 l c l c U − = .  We  further  assume  that  −∞ → 1 ρ   and 
1 2 = ρ .  Thus,  by  virtue  of the  (quasi-linear) utility  specification, the  only  purpose  of 
redistribution is to mitigate inequality across population groups. Finally, we assume that 
p S H T H = − = , , 1 α α >0.5, thus the degree of correlation is given by  ). 1 2 ( − = p r   
Figure  1 below  demonstrates the  optimal  policy  as a  function  of  the  two  key 
parameters of the model: the correlation between height and ability, and the difference in 
productivity across skills. Note that in the numerical solution we allow for the use of both 









































As can be observed from the figure, there are two upward sloping curves, which 
divide  the  space  into  three  distinct  regions.  The  uppermost  region  represents 
combinations of skill ratio and correlation for which affirmative action equilibrium does 
not exist. Solving  (11)  to  obtain  an  explicit  solution for  ε ,  employing the  quadratic 
specification,  yields  2 / ) ( ) 1 2 ( w w p − ⋅ − = ε .
19  The  feasibility  constraint  implies  that 
) 1 2 /( ) 1 2 ( / + − > ⇔ > p p w w w ε .  Thus,  as  observed  from  the  figure,  the  weaker  the 
correlation  (smaller  p),  the  less  binding  the  feasibility  constraint  becomes.  The 
                                                 
19  Note  that  the  comparative  static  results  derived  for  the  general  framework  hold  as 
0 /   and   0 / < ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ w p ε ε .    21
intermediate region (labeled 'tax-transfer') represents points in the skill ratio correlation 
space for which the tax-transfer forms the optimal policy; whereas for points within the 
rightmost region (labeled 'affirmative action'), affirmative action policy prevails.  
Several  remarks  are  in  order.  First,  the  optimal  policy  consists  of  either  an 
affirmative action policy or an optimal tax-transfer system. This somewhat surprising 
result derives from the fact that once affirmative action policy is in place, the tax-transfer 
system is redundant, as the government is assumed to have no taste for redistribution 
within  groups ( 1 2 = ρ ), and individuals' preferences  are quasi-linear.  In  general, even 
when income tax has no redistributive role across skills, it may well serve as a 'tagging' 
device to enhance redistribution across height groups. However, one can verify that due 
to the quadratic specification, the welfare aggregates of the two population groups are 
equalized by affirmative action, hence leaving no re-distributive role for the tax-and-
transfer  system.  Second,  as  argued  above,  even  though  society  is  assumed  to  care 
(extremely) only about inequality across population groups, affirmative action may not be 
part of the optimal policy. This would happen when the correlation between height and 
skill is high enough (for a given skill difference). The reason is that when re-distribution 
across  groups  is  at  stake,  a  high  correlation  makes  the  tax-and-transfer  system  an 
effective  re-distributive  tool:  although  a  height-blind  tax-and-transfer  system  cannot 
directly provide transfers to short individuals, it can do so indirectly by subsidizing low-
skilled individuals who are more likely to be short. Moreover, as the correlation between 
height and skill rises, the distortion of an affirmative action policy increases (an increased 
wage subsidy to the short and a corresponding increased wage tax levied on the tall, for    22
each  skill  level)  to  ensure  appropriate  representation  in  the  labor  market;  that  is, 
reflecting the groups’ relative shares in the general population. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
The  primary  goal  of  the  welfare  system  is  to  target  benefits  to  certain  needy 
populations. This is done either through self-selection of the beneficiaries or by setting 
eligibility criteria. The efficiency of the welfare system depends on the extent to which 
individuals' incentives to be identified as 'needy' can be minimized. Indeed, when there is 
a positive correlation between height (an exogenously given observable attribute) and 
skill  (an  exogenously  given  unobservable  attribute),  allowing  for  height-sensitive 
transfers would enhance redistribution without entailing distortions (as individuals cannot 
affect their eligibility status – the latter being based on some exogenously given observed 
characteristic). The fact that a height-sensitive tax-and-transfer system is controversial on 
moral, political or constitutional grounds renders affirmative action policy a second-best 
optimal  tagging  device.  We  show  that  affirmative  action  policy  could  play  a  useful 
redistributive role by supplementing a height-blind income tax system when its entailed 
distortions are moderate, as it serves to mitigate the incentive compatibility constraints 
faced by the government in pursuing its redistributive goal.  
We further discuss the possibility of extending the standard welfare function by 
assuming  that  society  cares  not  only  about  inequality  across  skills  but  also  about 
redistribution  across  groups.  We  show  that,  although  the  case  for  affirmative  action 
seems  to  be  the  strongest  when  redistribution  across  groups  is  the  primary  policy 
objective, affirmative action may well be socially undesirable in such a case. Thus, the 
social desirability of employing affirmative action policy for redistributive purposes is    23
not a foregone conclusion, and will generally depend on the relative weights assigned to 
the various redistributive concerns, as well as on the correlation between height and skill. 
Three  final  remarks  are  in  order.  First,  whereas  this  paper  focuses  on  the 
redistributive aspects of affirmative action policy, there are two other major justifications, 
often discussed in the literature: offsetting discrimination (prejudice-driven or statistical) 
and internalizing externalities.  
Second, designing policies that exploit correlations between race and unobserved 
traits, while generally known to be efficient, is nevertheless controversial. One salient 
example  is  the  practice  of  racial  profiling  in  the  context  of  criminal  enforcement. 
Although efficient, racial profiling is often rejected on equity grounds. The equity costs 
entailed by using racial profiling is not due to the intrinsically discriminating nature of 
the policy tool (as it is driven by efficiency considerations, that is, minimizing crime, and 
not by prejudice), but rather due to its expressive nature, when the targeted population 
has suffered from discrimination on other grounds (see Risse and Zeckhauser, 2004). For 
example, this would be the case when police target black drivers in drug searches. In our 
case,  as  we  are  discussing  welfare  policy,  the  group  that  has  been  subject  to 
discrimination  is  the  one  that  stands  to  benefit  from  the  profiling/tagging  policy 
proposed. This may somewhat mitigate the equity concerns. That said, even members of 
groups  that  have  not  been  discriminated  against  (the  tall  individuals),  may  still  find    24
affirmative action to be discriminatory. This may explain the use of less efficient forms 
of affirmative action than the one discussed in this paper, such as height-blind policies.
20 
Finally, in order to mitigate the distortions entailed by affirmative action, one may 
consider  using  alternative  forms  of  affirmative  action  than  the  one  discussed  in  the 
current  paper.  One  possibility  is  to  allow  for  policies  aimed  at  increasing  the 
representation of the targeted groups in the labor market, but to a lesser extent than their 
relative  share  in  the  general  population.  Another  possibility  would  be  to  allow  for 
differential  targets  across  occupations;  for  instance,  setting  more  rigid  targets  for 




                                                 
20  For example, public university systems in California, Florida and Texas base their admission decisions 
on social traits that are merely correlated with race instead of taking race explicitly into account. See Chan 
and Eyster (2003); Fryer, Loury and Yuret (2006).    25
Appendix A 
Formulation of the Integrated Government Problem 
When affirmative action policy is in place, there are four different wage rates in the labor 
market, denoted by  . ,   and   ,    where , S T j L H i w j i = =  A tax-and-transfer system is given 
by  four  (y,  c)  bundles,  one  for  each  type  of  individual.  The  government  seeks  to 
maximize the welfare function given by: 
(A1)  ∑∑ =
i
j i j i
j
j i c y w V W ρ
ρ / ) , , ( , , ,  , 
by  choosing  the  four  gross  income-net  income  bundles  and  by  setting  the  wage 
differential, denoted by ε , subject to 12 self-selection (no mimicking) constraints (three 
for each type of individual), given by: 
(A2)  ) , , ( ) , , ( ' , ' ' , ' , , , , j i j i j i j i j i j i c y w V c y w V ≥ , for all  j i j i j i , ' , '   and   , ≠ ; 
an affirmative action constraint which requires that short individuals are represented in 
the labor market according to their relative share in the  general population, which is 
given by: 
(A3)  ∑ ∑ ⋅ = ⋅
i
S i S i S i
i
T i T i T i w y w y , , , , , , / / α α ; 
and the firm's profit maximization conditions (under the affirmative action regime), given 
by: 
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Appendix B 
Proof of the Proposition 
We prove that under the condition stated in the proposition, affirmative action would 
dominate  the tax-and-transfer  system  and  hence  should  be  part  of the optimal  policy 
alongside the tax-and-transfer system.  
Suppose that  −∞ = ρ . Consider the case of perfect correlation between height and skill, 
that is,  1   and   0 , , = = T H S H α α .  
Recall that in the case of perfect correlation, affirmative action policy fully equalizes the 
wage  rates  (hence  the  income  and  consumption  levels)  across  all  individuals  in  the 
economy.  We  denote  the  uniform  wage  rate  (equaling  the  average  productivity)  by 
2 / ) ( ˆ w w w + ≡ ,  and  the  associated  income  level  (hence  the  consumption  level  in  the 
absence of taxation) by y ˆ . Denote the welfare measures for the optimal tax system and 
the affirmative action rule, respectively, by 
Tax W and 
Aff W . Maintaining the notation used 
in the text, it follows that: 
(B1)  ) , , ( y c w V W
Tax = , 
(B2)  ] ˆ , ˆ , ˆ [ y y w V W
Aff = , 
Note  that  when  w w= ,  it  follows  that  y y w w ˆ c     , ˆ = = =   and,  obviously, 
Aff Tax W W = ,  as  there  is  no  inequality  to  begin  with.  Differentiating  the  two  welfare 
measures associated with the optimal tax system and the affirmative action rule with 
respect to  w, and evaluating the derivatives at  w w= , using the envelope theorem, and 
noting the fact that the self-selection constraint for the low-skilled type is non-binding, it 
follows that:    27
(B3)  . 2 / ) / , ( ) / , (
w
y
w y c U




w y c U










   
where  c U =1 by virtue of the quasi-linear utility specification. Thus, it follows, by virtue 
of a first-order approximation, that for  w close enough to  w, the affirmative action rule 
attains a higher level of welfare than the optimal tax system.
b1  
  By  continuity  considerations,  the  result  extends  to  social  welfare  functions 
exhibiting a sufficiently high degree of inequality aversion (a sufficiently small value of 
ρ ) and to the cases where there exists a sufficiently high correlation between height and 




Crucially, note that the result does not extend to the case of high (but less than perfect) 
correlation, when the social welfare function is Rawlsian, as in such a case the welfare 
measure will not be continuous with respect to  T H, α , at  1 , = T H α . To see this, note that for 
the  case  of  perfect  correlation  between  height  and  skill,  the  wage  differential  under 
affirmative action policy (as derived in section 2.1 in the text) is strictly positive and 
given by  2 / ) ( w w − = ε . Under perfect correlation, the least advantaged individual in the 
economy (whose utility is being maximized) would be a low-skilled short worker. When 
the correlation is high (but less than perfect), there is a positive fraction of low-skilled tall 
workers  in  the  economy.  By  virtue  of  the  affirmative  action  policy,  the  most 
disadvantaged individuals in the economy in such a case would be the low-skilled tall 
                                                 
b1  Recall that the affirmative action equilibrium exists when the productivity difference between the two 
skill levels is sufficiently small.    28
individuals, as their wage rate would be reduced (relative to the low-skilled short). Thus, 
there  would  be  a  discontinuous  jump  in  the  wage  rate  of  the  most  disadvantaged 
individual (by the amount of  0 2 > ε ), as we shift from the case of perfect correlation to 
the case of high (but less than perfect) correlation, hence a discontinuous jump in the 
welfare measure. Thus, the continuity consideration used in the proposition with respect 
to the correlation between skill and height would be invalid. In fact, affirmative action 
policy would result in a decrease in the welfare measure in the Rawlsian case, when 
1 , < T H α .     29
References 
Akerlof, G. (1978). "The Economics of Tagging as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax," 
American Economic Review 68, 8-19. 
Arrow,  K.  (1998).  "What  Has  Economics  to  Say  about  Racial  Discrimination?" 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 91-100.  
Bell, D. (1992). Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism. New York: 
Basic Books.  
Bloch,  F.  (1994).  Antidiscrimination  Law  and  Minority  Employment.  Chicago:  U. 
Chicago Press.   
Chan,  J.  and  Eyster,  E.  (2003).  “Does  Banning  Affirmative  Action  Lower  College 
Student Quality?” American Economic Review, 93, 858-872. 
Cooter, R. (1994). “Market Affirmative Action,” San Diego Law Review 31, 133-168.  
Darity W. and Frank, D. (2003). “The Economics of Reparations,” American Economic 
Review, 93, 326-329. 
Donohue, J. (1998). "Discrimination in Employment," The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law 615, Peter Newman Edition. 
Edley, C. (1996). Not All Black and White. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Epstein, R. (1992). Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination 
Laws. Cambridge, NA: Harvard U. Press.   
Fiss, O. (1976). “Groups and Equal Protection Clause,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 
5(2), 107-177.  
Fryer, R. (2004). “Implicit Quotas,” working paper.  
Fryer, R. and Levitt, S. (2004). "The Black-White Test Score Gap Through Third Grade,"    30
American Law and Economic Review (forthcoming).   
Fryer,  R.  and  Loury,  G.  (2005).  "Affirmative  Action  and  Its  Mythology" 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 147-162. 
Fryer,  R.,  Loury,  G.  and  Yuret,  T.  (2006).  “An  Economic  Analysis  of  Color-Blind 
Affirmative Action,” working paper.  
Kull, A. (1994). "The Discrimination Shibboleth," San Diego Law Review, 31, 195-201.  
Loury,  G.  (1977).  "A  Dynamic  Theory  of  Racial  Income  Differences,"  Chap.  8.  P. 
Wallace (ed),  Women,  Minorities and Employment Discrimination,  Lexington Books, 
153-186.  
______  .  (1998).  "Discrimination  in  the  Post-Civil  Rights  Era:  Beyond  Market 
Interactions." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 117-26.  
Mirrlees,  J.  (1971).  "An  Exploration  in  the  Theory  of  Optimum  Income  Taxation," 
Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175-208. 
Parry & Portney, Paul & Harrington, Winston & Gruenspecht (2003). "Policy Watch: 
The Economics of Fuel Economy Standards," Journal of Economics Perspectives 17(4) 
203-217.  
Risse, M. and Zeckhauser, R. (2004). "Racial Profiling," Philosophy and Public Affairs 
32, 131-170.  
Rubenfeld, J. (1997). "Affirmative Action," Yale Law Journal 107, 427-472.  
Sadka,  E.  (1976).  "On  Income  Distribution,  Incentive  Effects  and  Optimal  Income 
Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, 43, 261-67. 
Schuck, P. (2002). “Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future,” Yale Law & Policy 
Review 20, 1-96.     31
Schuman, H, Steeh C., Bobo L. and Krysan M. (1997). Racial Attitudes in America: 
Trends and Interpretations, Harvard University Press.  
Stiglitz,  J.  (1982).  "Self  Selection  and  Pareto  Efficient  Taxation",  Journal  of  Public 
Economics, 17, 213-240. 
Sunstein, C. (1994). "The Anticaste Principle," Michigan Law Review 92, 2410-2455. CESifo Working Paper Series 




1940 Monika Bütler and Michel André Maréchal, Framing Effects in Political Decision 
Making: Evidence from a Natural Voting Experiment, March 2007 
 
1941 Giacomo Corneo and Olivier Jeanne, A Theory of Tolerance, March 2007 
 
1942 Qing Hong and Michael Smart, In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and 
Foreign Direct Investment, March 2007 
 
1943 Yin-Wong Cheung, Dickson Tam and Matthew S. Yiu, Does the Chinese Interest Rate 
Follow the US Interest Rate?, March 2007 
 
1944 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, Unemployment and Gang Crime: Could Prosperity 
Backfire?, March 2007 
 
1945 Burkhard Heer, On the Modeling of the Income Distribution Business Cycle Dynamics, 
March 2007 
 
1946 Christoph A. Schaltegger and Lars P. Feld, Are Fiscal Adjustments less Successful in 
Decentralized Governments?, March 2007 
 
1947 Giovanni Facchini, Marcelo Olarreaga, Peri Silva and Gerald Willmann, Substitutability 
and Protectionism: Latin America’s Trade Policy and Imports from China and India, 
March 2007 
 
1948 C. Mirjam van Praag and Bernard M. S. van Praag, The Benefits of Being Economics 
Professor A (and not Z), March 2007 
 
1949 Astrid Hopfensitz and Frans van Winden, Dynamic Choice, Independence and 
Emotions, March 2007 
 
1950 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, A Multivariate Long-Memory Model 
with Structural Breaks, March 2007 
 
1951 Mattias Ganslandt and Keith E. Maskus, Wholesale Price Discrimination and Parallel 
Imports, March 2007 
 
1952 Michela Redoano, Fiscal Interactions Among European Countries. Does the EU 
Matter?, March 2007 
 
1953 Stefan C. Wolter, Rémy Hübschi and Matthias Müller, Push or Pull? An Empirical 
Analysis of the Demand for Individual Project Grants from the Swiss National Science 




1954 Scott Alan Carson, African-American and White Inequality in the American South: 
Evidence from the 19
th Century Missouri State Prison, March 2007 
 
1955 Peter Egger, Marko Koethenbuerger and Michael Smart, Do Fiscal Transfers Alleviate 
Business Tax Competition? Evidence from Germany, March 2007 
 
1956 Panu Poutvaara and Lars-H. R. Siemers, Smoking and Social Interaction, March 2007 
 
1957 Stephan Danninger and Fred Joutz, What Explains Germany’s Rebounding Export 
Market Share?, March 2007 
 
1958 Stefan Krasa and Mattias Polborn, Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a 
Binary Policy Model, March 2007 
 
1959 Thiess Buettner and Georg Wamser, Intercompany Loans and Profit Shifting – 
Evidence from Company-Level Data, March 2007 
 
1960 Per Pettersson-Lidbom and Mikael Priks, Behavior under Social Pressure: Empty Italian 
Stadiums and Referee Bias, April 2007 
 
1961 Balázs Égert and Carol S. Leonard, Dutch Disease Scare in Kazakhstan: Is it real?, 
April 2007 
 
1962 Paul De Grauwe and Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser, Modeling Optimism and Pessimism in 
the Foreign Exchange Market, April 2007 
 
1963 Volker Grossmann and Thomas M. Steger, Anti-Competitive Conduct, In-House R&D, 
and Growth, April 2007 
 
1964 Steven Brakman and Charles van Marrewijk, It’s a Big World After All, April 2007 
 
1965 Mauro Ghinamo, Paolo M. Panteghini and Federico Revelli, FDI Determination and 
Corporate Tax Competition in a Volatile World, April 2007 
 
1966 Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo, Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean 
Technologies when Pollution is Random, April 2007 
 
1967 Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, Efficient CO2 Emissions Control with National 
Emissions Taxes and International Emissions Trading, April 2007 
 
1968 Michela Redoano, Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?, April 
2007 
 
1969 Christian Gollier, Intergenerational Risk-Sharing and Risk-Taking of a Pension Fund, 
April 2007 
 
1970 Swapan K. Bhattacharya and Biswa N. Bhattacharyay, Gains and Losses of India-China 
Trade Cooperation – a Gravity Model Impact Analysis, April 2007 
 
1971 Gerhard Illing, Financial Stability and Monetary Policy – A Framework, April 2007  
1972 Rainald Borck and Matthias Wrede, Commuting Subsidies with two Transport Modes, 
April 2007 
 
1973 Frederick van der Ploeg, Prudent Budgetary Policy: Political Economy of Precautionary 
Taxation, April 2007 
 
1974 Ben J. Heijdra and Ward E. Romp, Retirement, Pensions, and Ageing, April 2007 
 
1975 Scott Alan Carson, Health during Industrialization: Evidence from the 19
th Century 
Pennsylvania State Prison System, April 2007 
 
1976 Andreas Haufler and Ian Wooton, Competition for Firms in an Oligopolistic Industry: 
Do Firms or Countries Have to Pay?, April 2007 
 
1977 Eckhard Janeba, Exports, Unemployment and the Welfare State, April 2007 
 
1978 Gernot Doppelhofer and Melvyn Weeks, Jointness of Growth Determinants, April 2007 
 
1979 Edith Sand and Assaf Razin, The Role of Immigration in Sustaining the Social Security 
System: A Political Economy Approach, April 2007 
 
1980 Marco Pagano and Giovanni Immordino, Optimal Regulation of Auditing, May 2007 
 
1981 Ludger Woessmann, Fundamental Determinants of School Efficiency and Equity: 
German States as a Microcosm for OECD Countries, May 2007 
 
1982 Bas Jacobs, Real Options and Human Capital Investment, May 2007 
 
1983 Steinar Holden and Fredrik Wulfsberg, Are Real Wages Rigid Downwards?, May 2007 
 
1984 Cheng Hsiao, M. Hashem Pesaran and Andreas Pick, Diagnostic Tests of Cross Section 
Independence for Nonlinear Panel Data Models, May 2007 
 
1985 Luis Otávio Façanha and Marcelo Resende, Hierarchical Structure in Brazilian 
Industrial Firms: An Econometric Study, May 2007 
 
1986 Ondřej Schneider, The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?, May2007 
 
1987 Sascha O. Becker and Ludger Woessmann, Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital 
Theory of Protestant Economic History, May 2007 
 
1988 Erkki Koskela and Rune Stenbacka, Equilibrium Unemployment with Outsourcing and 
Wage Solidarity under Labour Market Imperfections, May 2007 
 
1989 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Juncal Cunado and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Deterministic versus 
Stochastic Seasonal Fractional Integration and Structural Breaks, May 2007 
 
1990 Cláudia Costa Storti and Paul De Grauwe, Globalization and the Price Decline of Illicit 
Drugs, May 2007 
  
1991 Thomas Eichner and Ruediger Pethig, Pricing the Ecosystem and Taxing Ecosystem 
Services: A General Equilibrium Approach, May 2007 
 
1992 Wladimir Raymond, Pierre Mohnen, Franz Palm and Sybrand Schim van der Loeff, The 
Behavior of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator of Dynamic Panel Data Sample 
Selection Models, May 2007 
 
1993 Fahad Khalil, Jacques Lawarrée and Sungho Yun, Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the 
Lesser of two Evils, May 2007 
 
1994 Thorvaldur Gylfason, The International Economics of Natural Resources and Growth, 
May 2007 
 
1995 Catherine Roux and Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Leniency Programs in a 
Multimarket Setting: Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus, May 2007 
 
1996 J. Atsu Amegashie, Bazoumana Ouattara and Eric Strobl, Moral Hazard and the 
Composition of Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid, May 2007 
 
1997 Wolfgang Buchholz and Wolfgang Peters, Equal Sacrifice and Fair Burden Sharing in a 
Public Goods Economy, May 2007 
 
1998 Robert S. Chirinko and Debdulal Mallick, The Fisher/Cobb-Douglas Paradox, Factor 
Shares, and Cointegration, May 2007 
 
1999 Petra M. Geraats, Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique, May 2007 
 
2000 Hartmut Egger and Udo Kreickemeier, Firm Heterogeneity and the Labour Market 
Effects of Trade Liberalisation, May 2007 
 
2001 Andreas Freytag and Friedrich Schneider, Monetary Commitment, Institutional 
Constraints and Inflation: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1970s, 
May 2007 
 
2002 Niclas Berggren, Henrik Jordahl and Panu Poutvaara, The Looks of a Winner: Beauty, 
Gender, and Electoral Success, May 2007 
 
2003 Tomer Blumkin, Yoram Margalioth and Efraim Sadka, Incorporating Affirmative 
Action into the Welfare State, May 2007 